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Dean Nye, in his lecture on American power,' asked us to visualize a three-layered chess
game in which geopolitical strategies were played out. Most of the discussions at this
meeting have, for obvious reasons, focused on the top board in that game, the one on
which military power is exercised. This panel looks instead at the middle board, where
economic regulatory power is exercised, focusing on the power of states to regulate corporations and their activity on securities markets.
Questions of U.S. power and U.S. policy in this area are not new. Both the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the courts have addressed the extent to which
foreign countries should be subjected to U.S. disclosure requirements and antifraud
provisions. But the questions of power and policy have been sharply focused by recent
events. In 2002, in the wake of Enron's collapse, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. This legislation goes further than other securities laws both in its explicit application not only to foreign issuers but also to foreign auditing firms and in its regulation
not only of securities activities but of some areas of internal corporate governance.
Our distinguished panel will discuss U.S. regulation of corporate activity in light of
this new legislation. The panelists are Paul Dudek, previously with Cleary Gottlieb Steen
& Hamilton and now chief of the Office of International Corporate Finance at the SEC;
Roberta Karmel, formerly an SEC Commissioner and now professor at Brooklyn Law
School and codirector of its Center for the Study of International Business Law; and
Edward Kwalwasser, group executive vice president at the New York Stock Exchange.
REMARKS BY PAUL DuDEK**

In discussing how the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates foreign
companies whose securities trade in the United States, it may be useful to begin with
some background on the kinds of companies we are talking about.
There are three ways foreign companies can access the U.S. securities markets. The
first is to have their securities trade in the over-the-counter market. This is basically a
market between brokers; it is fairly illiquid and often not very transparent. There is minimal contact with the SEC, and these companies do not have to comply with SEC disclosure requirements. Because they do not comply with our requirements and make filings
with us, they do not really have the benefits of our market. These companies cannot raise
capital in the United States in a public offering and are not permitted to trade on our
most liquid markets: the NewYork Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, and
the NASDAQ Stock Market.
The second way for companies to access the U.S. market is to do a private placement
in the United States-the company raises capital privately in the United States. Again,
there is minimal SEC regulation: a private placement does not have to comply with our
disclosure requirements, although there must be some compliance with our procedural requirements relating to private offerings. These securities are sold only to larger
Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
'Joseph S. Nye,Jr., The Information Revolution and the ParadoxofAmerican Power, 97 ASIL PROC. 67 (2003).
.. Chief, Office of International Corporate Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the views of either the SEC or SEC staff.
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institutions, so there is no retail distribution. The most important aspect of privately placed
securities is that they are not freely tradeable within the United States, so if one of the
goals of the foreign company was to diversify its shareholder base, more likely than not,
those securities are going to end up back in the home market because it is not really possible to create a liquid market in the United States for privately placed securities.
Finally, the third way foreign companies can access the U.S. market is through a full
SEC registration. This entails a public offering just like one by a U.S. company, and a
full listing on a market like the New York Stock Exchange. This is the universe of companies we will be talking about today, companies that are registered with the SEC and
that trade on markets like NASDAQ or the New York Stock Exchange.
The SEC has long-standing initiatives designed to facilitate foreign issuer access to the
U.S. markets. The SEC views foreign listings in the U.S. market as benefitting several
constituencies. I think of it as a win-win-win situation: Investors win because they have
increased investment opportunities. They can more easily diversify their investment
portfolios while buying and selling securities on a regulated market in the United States.
Foreign issuers win because they have access to a liquid and deep capital market in the
United States; they also can diversify their shareholder base and more easily use their
stock to effect acquisitions in the United States. Markets also benefit because cross-border
listings increase the integration of the entire global economy.
Although there are accommodations the SEC has designed to make it a little easier
for foreign companies to register with the SEC, by and large, the disclosure and general
requirements that apply to U.S. companies apply to foreign companies as well. The annual report of any U.S. company and the annual report filed with the SEC by any foreign company will give largely the same kind of disclosures. In the business discussion
of what the company does, or in the results of operations section explaining why a company made or lost money, the same kinds of things are disclosed by a U.S. company or
a foreign company.
One important area where there is a need for comparison is the area of financial statements. A foreign company that registers with the SEC is required to prepare its financial
statements and have them audited by an accounting firm that is independent by U.S.
standards. The financial statements must be audited in accordance with U.S. generally
accepted auditing standards (GAAS), and they must have been prepared in accordance
with either U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), foreign GAAP (homecountry GAAP), or a set of principles known as International Accounting Standards
(IAS). In the last two cases, the financial information from home-country GAAP or IAS
must be reconciled with U.S. GAAP. This is a numerical reconciliation so that investors
can see what net income is, or what shareholders' equity is, under home-country GAAP
and can then see the adjustments that would be made under U.S. principles and a bottom-line net income number in accordance with U.S. GAAP.
For several reasons it is fairly important in this era to hold foreign companies to the
same basic disclosure standards as U.S. companies, not only for textual disclosure but also
in the financial statements. One reason is investor protection. It is important that investors have comparable information about the companies in the same industry. If a U.S.
investor is looking to invest in an automobile manufacturer in the United States, on the
New York Stock Exchange you will certainly find Ford and General Motors but also
Daimler-Chrysler, Fiat, and Toyota. U.S. investors should be able to compare all those
companies on the same basis. From the flip side, those companies are competing for
the same pool of investment capital. To maintain a level playing field between foreign
and U.S. companies, they must all be held to the same disclosure standards, especially
in the area of financial statements.
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Even though the same broad or general disclosure principles apply to foreign companies as to U.S. companies, the SEC has fashioned various formal and informal initiatives
to make the SEC registration process a little bit more palatable for foreign companies.
Let me review some of them quickly.
Foreign companies are exempt from the proxy regime that U.S. companies are subject to. Foreign companies also have more time to file their annual reports with the SEC;
U.S. companies must file three months after the fiscal year end (the end of March for
a calendar-year company). Foreign companies have six months.
Another significant accommodation is that interim reports can be made on the basis
of home-country rather than SEC disclosure requirements. A U.S. company must file
quarterly reports with the SEC and give notices and file reports when certain events happen, such as a change of auditors or a significant acquisition. For foreign companies,
however, we rely on the home-country reporting regime: For a UK company listed on the
London Stock Exchange, we would get during the year the interim reports the company
filed with the London exchange; for a Canadian company, those filed with a Canadian
exchange such as the Toronto Stock Exchange; for a Hong Kong company, those filed
with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In this way, the secondary market information
that is available in the home country supports the secondary market in the United States,
because for the vast majority of foreign companies, the United States is a secondary and
not the primary listing.
Another area where there is a significant accommodation relates to disclosure of
executive compensation. When the rules were first developed by the SEC some decades
ago, there was concern that they were very intrusive; that executive compensation was
very personal information and that one thing that would deter a CEO from deciding
that his company should list on the NewYork Stock Exchange would be having to reveal
his salary. That is why foreign companies have been exempt from the general requirement to disclose compensation of executives by name. Interestingly, through the 1980s
and certainly through the 1990s and the early 2000s, there has emerged a trend around
the world for more executive compensation disclosure, most notably in Canada and
gradually in Europe. From a governance point of view, other countries seem to be following the U.S. lead on disclosure of executive compensation, realizing that it is useful
information for making investment decisions.
The U.S. market has been very successful in attracting foreign listings to the United
States. In 1981, there were 173 foreign companies registered with the SEC. In 1991, there
were 439, and right now there arejust over 1,300 foreign companies registered. The range
has also changed dramatically. Twenty or even ten years ago, most of the foreign companies registered with the SEC were from Canada, along with some of the big companies from Europe. Now there are listed companies from all over Latin America, many
from Asia, some from Eastern Europe and Africa, and there are a lot more from countries where we in 1990 had almost no listings, like Germany and Switzerland.
There are at least two or three reasons why more foreign companies are coming here,
especially through the 1990s. The first is supply and demand. There has been a demand
from U.S. investors for foreign securities, and foreign companies have wanted to tap
into this U.S. investor interest and to raise capital here. It also has helped that we have
had a high-quality market, not only in terms of SEC standards but also with respect to
our regulated exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act passed last year in response to corporate scandals entails
reforms that are far-reaching and very dramatic, perhaps stronger than in any period
since the SEC was formed and the federal government first got into the business of
regulating the securities industry in the 1930s.
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The Sarbanes-Oxley Act sets many new requirements. Some provisions are self-operative, but many required SEC rule-writing to implement. In many cases, the SEC was faced
with the question of how the rules implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should affect
registered foreign companies. Many foreign companies and many foreign constituents
started commenting early on, even before the legislation was signed into law. As the SEC
went forward with implementing the statute, we stated that we would be fully faithful
to its letter and spirit, we would also be mindful of the impact of regulation on both U.S.
and global markets, and, in so doing, we were continuing a tradition of many decades.
As we went through the rule-writing, we worked toward a better understanding of how
this new law would apply to foreign companies.
The SEC is now basically finished with Sarbanes-Oxley rule-writing, and I think that
we have been true to our statement and have enacted the letter and spirit of SarbanesOxley with appropriate accommodations for foreign issuers. In areas where the act increased disclosure by U.S. companies, there is also to be increased disclosure by foreign
companies in areas such as whether a company has a financial expert on its audit committee, whether a foreign company has a code of ethics, and, more important perhaps,
off-balance sheet transactions. This last is a whole new section of disclosure that U.S.
companies and foreign companies must make in their annual reports and their prospectuses.
For disclosure-based matters, then, the same standards have been applied to foreign
and U.S. companies. Where there is some accommodation for foreign companies is in
areas that really would affect the internal corporate operations of a company, based on
a recognition that foreign companies have different governance structures than U.S.
companies. Sarbanes-Oxley is modeled on Delaware corporate law, which is fairly typical
in the United States. Foreign law allows for much different board structures and different internal arrangements. There was much concern among foreign companies about
Sarbanes-Oxley specifically detailing what an audit committee must do and that its members have to be independent, because those requirements were inconsistent with foreign
arrangements. Japanese boards really have no audit committees. Nor do Brazilian companies; they have something called a statutory board of auditors, but it is a completely
independent group of nondirectors. In addition, in some European countries there is
a requirement that employees be on the board of directors and also on the audit committee. Under Sarbanes-Oxley, the only people who can be on the audit committee are
those who are independent of the company, which would seem to exclude employees.
The SEC took the reasonable approach that what we and the Congress were really
focused on was senior management-the CEO, CFO, the chief accounting officer-not
just on any employee. To the extent that there are lower- or mid-level employees on a
board of directors under local law, as is true in Germany, Switzerland, and other
European countries, the SEC has accommodated that practice under Sarbanes-Oxley.
REMARKS BY ROBERTA KARMEL*

Le me try to put these problems in a broader perspective that may resonate with some
of the general themes of this conference. I am going to paint with a very broad brush,
going back all the way to 1933 and 1934, when the federal securities laws were passed,
because this history is of some importance in the current situation. From the 1930s until
the late 1970s or early 1980s, the SEC took what I would call an isolationist approach
to problems posed by foreign issuers and the sale of their securities to U.S. nationals.
* Professor and Codirector, Center for the Study of International Business Law, Brooklyn Law School;
former SEC Commissioner.
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A lot of people over the years have suggested that Congress never even thought about
foreign issuers when it passed the 1933 and 1934 Acts, but that is not true. Americans
lost considerable amounts of money in the late 1920s and 1930s because they bought
foreign bonds, among them sovereign debt. Congress was aware of this when it passed
the 1933 Act, and provided for it to some extent by having a special registration form
for foreign sovereign debt and by defining interstate commerce to include commerce
between states and foreign jurisdictions.
The attitude of the SEC staff for more than forty years after the 1933 Act was passed
was that if a foreign issuer was going to tap the U.S. capital markets, it should play by our
rules. This attitude was manifested in such policy initiatives as the Canadian and then
the foreign restricted list to keep out unregistered foreign companies. The SEC also made
very aggressive claims of extraterritorial application, and a whole series of cases was brought
under the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
I became a commissioner in the late 1970s, which, for certain business and political
reasons, was the end of this period. At that time, European investment bankers were up
in arms about the SEC. TheJapanese were also quite appalled by the SEC because the
Lockheed scandals, involving sensitive payments to foreign officials, had actually led to
the fall of a Japanese government. The high-water mark in terms of the staff's attitude
may have been the rule-making initiative on what became the primary registration form
for foreign issuers. A staff member came to the Commission table and asserted that the
only comments the Commission reviewed against this proposal were all from foreign
companies, so the SEC should not pay any attention to them.
This antiforeign attitude changed, for many reasons. As the Euro securities market
began to grow, the U.S. government came to appreciate that perhaps it was not such
a positive development to have a viable global market operating in London in competition with U.S. capital markets. Another factor in making the SEC more tolerant of internationalism was the beginning of an era of much greater cooperation between the SEC
and foreign regulators and the emergence of a truly international regulatory body in the
form of a changed International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO).
Previously, IOSCO had been just an inter-American regulatory group, but with SEC
encouragement it was transformed into a worldwide group of securities regulators. In
part, too, the evolution of IOSCO and an SEC framework for dealing with foreign issuers
was related to privatization programs in many European countries and to an interest on
the part of the governments of those countries in better securities disclosure and regulatory systems.
This was all part of the background for a period of what I would describe as a comity
or an internationalist approach to securities regulation, rather than an isolationist approach. The SEC revised its forms for foreign issuer registration. Beyond that, the staff
began to try very hard to accommodate the needs of foreign issuers that were listing or
raising capital in the United States, although it did continue to insist on the reconciliation
of foreign accounting statements to U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).
During this period of accommodation, the staff drafted Regulation S, which redefined the
parameters of offshore offerings. It also wrote Rule 144A to assist private placements to
institutions by foreign issuers. One consequence of this change in attitude and the
changes in the global markets was a great increase in foreign issuer registrations with
the SEC and in U.S. stock exchange listings of foreign companies. There were significant improvements in many foreign regulatory systems, too, which laid the foundation
for an international securities regulatory regime.
The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation enacted in 2002, in contrast, reflects a unilateralist approach to foreign issuer registration. I hope this approach does not persist, and that the
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SEC quickly returns to a more internationalist approach. The statute by and large makes
no real exceptions for foreign issuers and applies on its face to foreign issuers that have
securities registered with the SEC. A few months ago, I also would have said the statute
had wholly unrealistic time frames for rulemaking, but somehow the SEC staff, in a very
professional manner, managed to meet all those deadlines.
The SEC was in a very difficult situation, under political attack from all quarters in the
aftermath of many serious financial scandals. This made it extremely difficult for the SEC
to do much to accommodate foreign issuers-or for that matter, U.S. issuers-who had
serious problems with the Sarbanes-Oxley mandates. In the short term, this has led to
frustrated and angry comment letters from European commentators and a sharp decline in the number of foreign listings. On the other hand, there is a worldwide recession, so the economy probably is also a factor in the decline in the number of foreign
listings. Nevertheless, the extraterritoriality of Sarbanes-Oxley has ironically created a
political obstacle to foreign regulators and the SEC cooperating in creating a global framework to prevent the sorts of corporate governance problems that led to Sarbanes-Oxley.
Sarbanes-Oxley imposes bureaucratic solutions and prescriptive rules upon public
corporations, U.S. and foreign, in an attempt to impose blame for past failings on specific companies and also to prevent future financial debacles. Some parts of SarbanesOxley were well-considered; for example, the creation of the new Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board as a new regime for regulating auditing firms. Other provisions were included either to address matters the SEC had wanted to regulate for a long
time or in response to the headlines of the day-for example, a provision preventing
companies from making loans to officers, which has rankled many foreign issuers as
well as caused problems for U.S. companies.
The model that Congress had in mind in enacting Sarbanes-Oxley was the U.S. public
corporation, but many corporations in otherjurisdictions have very different corporate
governance models and very different systems of corporate finance. It is difficult, if not
impossible, for those companies to comply fully with Sarbanes-Oxley. The SEC has done
what it could to make accommodations in the corporate governance area, but it has
been under such intense political pressure that it did not really have a chance to fashion accommodations for all the foreign interests that were seeking such flexibility. The
SEC did have a number of roundtables to listen to the complaints and requests of foreign issuers. My hope is that the agency will be able to determine which new provisions
can, in fact, be honored by foreign issuers and which cannot, and will make the necessary accommodations so that the statute is not honored in the breach. Particularly
troublesome aspects of the statute are the requirements regarding the structure of audit
committees, loans to executives and forfeiture of bonuses, publication of codes of ethics,
definition of financial experts, audit committee composition, off-balance sheet transactions, auditor independence, registration of foreign auditors, and regulation of foreign
attorneys-and there are many other contentious provisions as well.
Finally, take one specific example: the disclosure requirements relating to financial
experts. The SEC has in some ways acknowledged certain problems by saying that the
definition of "financial expert" for purposes of a foreign company's audit committee
includes someone who is an expert in foreign GAAP, not necessarily in U.S. GAAP. But
all companies are required to disclose whether or not they have financial experts. It will
be unfortunate if companies that find this provision troublesome simply disclose that
they do not have a financial expert on their audit committees. What help would that be
to investors? This is just one example of the kinds of problems that the SEC and public
companies will run into with the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley.
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The SEC has been walking along the road of international cooperation long enough
that it should notjust stop short and go back to the more hostile attitude it had in past
days. In the future, hopefully there will come another era in which the SEC and foreign
regulators work together to solve problems of investor confidence in global markets.
REMARKS BY EDWARD KWALWASSER*

The New York Stock Exchange, as a private corporation, has no direct ability to promulgate corporate governance standards for any corporation, but we do have listing standards. We can set forth who we believe it is appropriate to list and trade in our marketplace.
As a result of the Enron and WorldCom failures, the Exchange formed a blue-ribbon
panel to see if there was a way to enhance our listing standards so as to regain the confidence of the investing public, which was clearly shaken by what went on at Enron and
WorldCom, and several other corporations along the way. The committee was headed
by three of our non-securities industry directors, Carl McCall, then comptroller of the
State of NewYork,Jerry Levin, then chairman of AOL, and Leon Panetta, White House
chief of staff in the previous administration. The committee they put together included
directors from private issuers who are on our board and the heads of our pension managers advisory committee, legal advisory committee, and institutional investors advisory
committee. This committee met over four months, hearing witnesses from twenty-seven
different groups, from corporations to the AFL-CIO. The witnesses all set forth what
they believed was needed to upgrade corporate governance. We also had more than three
hundred comment letters from sources around the world, including foreign private
issuers, U.S. issuers, lots of institutional investors, and groups that represented institutional investors.
The outcome was that the exchange developed a whole group of new standards that
will apply to any company seeking to list on the New York Stock Exchange. Previously,
most of the standards had dealt with requirements on the financial side, related to earnings, capital, and number of investors. After taking all the testimony and reading all the
comment letters, the committee decided that the most important thing was to substantially increase the influence of independent directors on the board of directors of any
company. They did that by requiring that a majority of the directors of every company
that lists on the NewYork Stock Exchange be independent directors as defined by the
exchange.This was a major change in the corporate governance requirements, particularly for small corporations. We understand that it will be much more difficult for companies to get people to serve as independent directors; particularly, it will be much more
difficult to get independent directors to serve on audit committees. But we said not only
that the majority of the directors must be independent, but also that every corporation
must have a compensation committee, a nominating committee and an audit committee
made up entirely of independent directors (with one exemption: if a company has a
majority owner, although it must still under Sarbanes-Oxley have an audit committee
made up entirely of independent directors, the majority of the board and both the nominating committee and the compensation committee do not have to be made up totally
of independent directors). We also said that before each board meeting, nonmanagement directors must meet without management.
Although the SEC has not yet approved these rules, many corporations that know the
rules are going to be approved are implementing most of them before they have to.
The stock exchange itself has implemented the board of directors rule, and before
every meeting of the board there is a meeting of our nonmanagement directors.
' Group Executive Vice President, New York Stock Exchange.
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The exchange has also mandated that each company have a code of ethics and that
the code be set forth in its annual report so that investors can determine whether they
think the code is appropriate. Foreign private issuers are not subject to these rules but
must disclose any material difference between the corporate governance structure under
which they operate and the corporate governance structure that other private issuers trading on the exchange are bound to maintain.
We also said that all stock options plans must be voted on by shareholders. In the
past, we had required only those shareholder plans dealing with officers and directors,
not broad-based plans, to be voted on by shareholders.
Another issue that raised questions with the SEC staffwas how to define director independence. We had set specific standards dealing with employment by the corporation:
employees or officers of the corporation would have to wait five years after departure
from the corporation before they could be considered independent. For an officer of
an accounting firm, the waiting period would also be five years. But otherwise we said it
was the duty of the board to determine whether any director had such a material conflict
that the director could not be determined to be independent. NASDAQ resolved this
question with some bright-line rules-for instance, if the company contributed more
than $60,000 to a charity, a director associated with that charity could not be considered
independent. We think we have reached an accommodation with the Commission
whereby we will set some bright lines but still permit a company's board to have some
say in the final determination.
With respect to foreign private issuers, about 12 percent of all the companies trading
on the New York Stock Exchange are foreign private issuers; they represent about 10
percent of exchange volume. The New York Stock Exchange now does a total of about
1.5 billion shares a day, average daily volume. That means that foreign private issuers
trade about 150 million shares a day--more than the total volume of the NewYork Stock
Exchange fifteen years ago. Foreign private issuers are a very important part of our
business. Certain companies have told us that Sarbanes-Oxley is a substantial impediment to them coming to the United States (though the global recession may also be a
factor). The SEC staff has been extremely helpful in defining Sarbanes-Oxley for foreign private issuers in certain countries that by law could not comply with the specific
wording of Sarbanes-Oxley. We at the Exchange have been going out on road shows to
Europe, and soon to Asia, to explain what we and the SEC have done and how foreign
companies can deal effectively with Sarbanes-Oxley. Although there are still some problems, the SEC staff is working hard to come to grips with them. We hope that, in the not
too distant future, it will really be the economy that determines whether foreign private
issuers come to the United States and list on the New York Stock Exchange.
One reason companies come to the United States has not yet been discussed, and it
does not relate to trading markets. You will notice that foreign issuers represent 12 percent of listed companies but only 10 percent of the volume on the Stock Exchange. Many
foreign private issuers come to the United States and list on the Stock Exchange, without
making any public offering in the United States, because they have taken over a corporation in the United States and want to be able to reward their employees with either
stock or options and offer a market in which those employees, at some point, can get
out. That is another reason we need to have rules-not that the United States should
lower its standards, because I do not think that's the case-that permit foreign private
issuers that want to do the right thing to come to the market and be listed on the Stock
Exchange.

